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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
DRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS
The existence, and probable continuance, of the first extensive peacetime military conscription in United States history underscores the need
for a means of securing court review of draft classifications which will
adequately protect individual liberties without unduly hampering rapid
mobilization. During the last two wars the usual means for obtaining
review of a classification was through habeas corpus proceedings after
induction into the service.1 Following World War II, in 1946, the
Supreme Court held that alleged invalidity of a draft classification may
be used as a defense in a criminal prosecution for failure to report for
induction. 2 A recent district court case3 has attempted to improve these
methods of obtaining review by adopting the constructive custody concept which permits review by habeas corpus before either induction or
indictment for failure to submit to induction. The inadequacy of the
established remedy is evident, but the efficacy of the latest proposal
requires close scrutiny.
Despite usual rigidity of the judicial attitude in this area, a tendency toward liberality has been manifested in the decisions since World
War II. Possibly the current trend 4 owes its impetus to the nature of
the present conscription situation-a peacetime draft-which is unique
when viewed in relation to the history of compulsory military service
in the-United States. 5
1. Ex parte Stewart, 47 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Filomio v. Powell, 38
F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1941) ; United States v. Mitchell, 248 Fed. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) ;
Ex parte Hutflis, 245 Fed. 798 (W.D.N.Y. 1917); Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54
(2d Cir. 1917) ; see also Connor and Clarke, Judicial Investigation of Selective Service
Action, 19 TULANE L REv. 344, 349 (1945).
2. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
3. Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Petitioner for habeas
corpus was attending an Italian university as a medical student, which he alleged made
him eligible for a statutory exemption from service. However, he was classified 1-A
and received orders to report for induction. He did not report, was placed on a delinquent
list, and a United States Attorney directed him to return to the United States or be
indicted. Fabiani returned and petitioned for habeas corpus to test the validity of his
classification. The writ was contested on the grounds that habeas corpus should not lie
until the petitioner had been inducted and was in physical custody of the armed services.
The court found the existing custody sufficient and granted the writ.
4. See note 51 infra, and accompanying text.
5. This history is as old as that of the Republic itself. Compulsory service was
endorsed by Hamilton. THE FEDERALIST, No. 29 (Hamilton). In the Revolution conscription was utilized by Virginia and Massachusetts; see 6 ENcYc. BRITTANICA 285
(1946). There was no uniform draft throughout the Confederation, although the Continental Congress recommended that the states employ a draft to fill their battalions of
Continental troops. 10 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 200 (United States
Government Printing Office, 1908). That was the furthest that the strong feeling of

NOTES

Required military service in this nation traditionally has been of
an emergency character as opposed to the large standing army system
utilized by most of the continental countries. 6 Not only has there been
a distinction concerning conscription as contrasted with other countries,
but the nature of compelled military service in the United States has
varied from war to war. In the Civil War Congress permitted an
eligible selectee to buy a substitute to fight in his place for $300;7 moreover, compulsory service was invoked only in those localities which failed
to enroll their enlistment quotas." An understandable resentment arose
among those unable to purchase an alternate, 9 and there were occasional
riots and demonstrations protesting the conscription. Furthermore, a
nationwide draft was not put into effect until 186310 when there was a
definite manpower shortage' which engendered a severe attitude toward
those who attempted to evade service.
The framers of the 1917 Selective Service Act seemingly took
cognizance of the errors in the 1863 conscription system for they succeeded in developing a program which received public support. The
Act1 2 permitted no substitutes and was applied equally to the entire

nation rather than merely to certain localities. To instill confidence in
the fairness of the procedures used, and in order that local situations
might be considered, the classification task was delegated to uncompensated workers in the county where the registrants resided. An intrasystem method of appeals for challenging these classifications was in3
augurated.'
Once more, however, selective service legislation was not enacted
until a pronounced need for rapid mobilization materialized.' 4 Hence,
this too was an emergency enactment, and recalcitrant registrants consequently received a minimum of leniency. Indicative of the stigma
attached to one who failed to volunteer were the methods employed by
sovereignty in each of the states would permit drafting to extend. See Upton, MILITARY
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 33, 35 (United States Government Printing Office, 1912).
6. See Connor, Due Process and the Selective Service System, 30 VA. L. REV. 435,

458 (1944).
7. 1 PROBLEMS OF SErEcnvE SERvIcE 8 (Selective Service System, 1952).
8. Id. at 16.
9. 1 MORISON AND COMMAGER, GROWTH OF THE AmERICAN REPuBLIc 705 (4th ed.
1950) and see also 1 PROBLEMS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 17.

10. 12 STAT. 731 (1863). Prior to this the President was authorized to "enroll"
men between 18 and 45 in state militias. 12 STAT. 597 (1862).
11. 1 Problems, op cit. supra note 7, at 16.
12. 40 STAT. 76 (1917).
13. Id. at 79 (1917).
14. 1 MORISON AND COMMAGER, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 478.
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the Selective Service System, such as "slacker raids" in public places
where draft-age males were required to show credentials.' 5
When World War II loomed imminent, Congress, in 1940, enacted
another Selective Service Act. 16 It served as the model for the 1951
statute,17 and resembled the 1917 Act in that classifications were determined by "neighbors" of the registrants and a similar mode of appeal
Unlike previous conscription statutes, the 1940 Act
was utilized.'
became effective before voluntary enlistments proved inadequate. The
perilous world situation in 1940 left no question as to the nature and
purpose of the Act-it was an emergency measure designed to rapidly
increase United States military strength. Indicative of the temper of
the times was the persistence of local and appeal boards in adhering to
the standards of the 1917 Act with regard to conscientious objectors, 19
20
even though the 1940 Act considerably liberalized those provisions.
The Act declared classification determinations of local boards to
be final, except for appeals within the System.2 ' Maximum utilization
of a nation's manpower is a monumental task, however, and the classifications created by the Selective Service Regulations were necessarily
complex. Adherence to congressional direction involved categorizing
men as ministers and divinity students, agricultural workers, conscientious objectors, family hardship cases, and those supporting the national
health, safety, or interest. Since the boards were composed of laymen,
erroneous classifications were inevitable.2 2 These difficulties, coupled
15. 1 Problems, op. cit. supra note 7,at 18.
16.

54 STAT. 885 (1940).

17. 50 U.S.C.App. §460 (1951).
18. 54STAT.893 (1940)

(§

10(a) (2)).

19. United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1943). The
court pointed out that a provision similar to that in the 1917 statute was in the original
bill for the 1940 Act, but that the bill was amended to its present more lenient form
both for the benefit of individuals and for ease of administration. See H.R. REP. No.
10,132, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1, 201-211 (1940); 86 CONG. REc. 10, 106 (1940).
20. Compare 54 STAT. 889 (1940) (§5(g)) with 40 STAT. 79 (1917) (§4).
21. 54 STAT.893 (1940). The 1948 and 1951 Acts made the same provision. 62 STAT.
619 (1948) ; 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1951).
22. The nature of the task is necessarily difficult because fact situations are bound
to arise which are not easily classed in any preconceived category. Probably most litigation
stemmed from dissatisfaction with classification of conscientious objectors and ministers.
An investigation of the governing statutes and regulations will give an indication of the
possible borderline cases that might appear. A part of the statute states, "[niothing in
this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training
and service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 54
STAT. 889 (1940). The Regulations of the Selective Service System recognize two types
of ministers of religion, "regular" and "duly ordained." "'A regular minister of religion'
isa man who customarily preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a recognized
church, religious sect, or religious organization of which he is a member, without having

NOTES
with a sometimes perverse attitude on the part of the boards, made
apparent a need for review apart from appeals within the administrative
hierarchy. Thus, the courts, adopting World War I decisions, early
decided that the statutory provisions calling for administrative finality
did not completely foreclose resort to the judiciary for review of local
23

board orders.

The judicial disposition toward availability of review of an allegedly
invalid classification has not been static. It has stretched from a temper
of extreme inclemency, resulting in the imprisonment of registrants for
failure to submit to induction although the classification was admittedly
invalid,2 4 to a marked propensity for liberality, exemplified by the constructive custody concept which permits a registrant to challenge his
classification2 5 prior to induction by writ of habeas corpus. Within these
been formally ordained as a minister of religion; and who is recognized by such church,
sect, or organization as a minister. A 'duly ordained minister of religion' is a man who
has been ordained in accordance with the ceremonial ritual or discipline of a recognized
church, religious sect, or religious organization, to teach and preach its doctrines and
to administer its rites and ceremonies in public worship; and who customarily performs
these duties." 32 CODE FED. REns. § 1622.19 (1949).
It is not difficult to imagine the latitude sometimes exercised in interpretation of
such words and phrases as, "religious training and belief," "participation in war in any
form," "[c]hurch, religious sect, or religious organization" and "public worship." An
example of how complex these situations can become is United States ex rel. Phillips
v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943), where the court granted habeas corpus to the
petitioner as a conscientious objector wrongfully classified 1-A and inducted into the
service. The decision rested on the meaning of the phrase, "by reason of religious
training and belief is opposed to war in any form." The court investigated such aspects
of the situation as whether the petitioner's belief was humanitarian and philosophical,
and had the-essence of religious belief, or was merely a political conviction; whether
he was opposed to war in general or merely to the then existing conflict. The court
went into a detailed examination of a dramatic piece, written by the petitioner, condemning war. Situations like this are complex, even for the courts, but to expect draft
boards staffed with laymen to decide such intricate factual problems successfully and
consistently is to demand a great deal. This problem is dealt with in United States v.
Kose, 106 F. Supp. 433 (D. Conn. 1951), where the court declared a classificatioh
invalid because the draft board members did not correctly understand the statute.
23. United States ex tel. Zucker v. Osborne, 147 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United
States ex rel. Filomio v. Powell, 38 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1941).
24. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1943) affirms a conviction
for failing to report for induction. Augustus Hand, speaking for the court, declared:
"Even though the Local Draft and Appeal Boards may have committed an error of
law in classifying a conscientious objector as a man available for combat service his
rights under § 5(g) are not abridged in any practical sense until he is subjected to
military 'training and service' after formal induction into the Army... The justification
for the burden upon the individual of subjecting him to such proceedings instead of
stopping them at the outset by injunctive or other relief in the courts lies in the absence
of an alternative consistent with the orderly conduct of the government's business, and
in this particular case, in the want of any suitable alternative method of selecting the
personnel of a large Army." Possibly the suitable alternative is adopted in Ex parte
Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
25. Ex parte Fabiani, supra note 24.
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boundaries of opinion there have been diverse attitudes among lower
courts toward judicial review in this area.
One determinate ramification of the various viewpoints espoused
was the establishment of a doctrine which made habeas corpus available
to a registrant to contest his classification following induction. 26 Other
procedures for judicial review were attempted subsequent to the 1940
Selective Service Act 27 but habeas corpus after induction emerged as

the only acceptable method short of the nebulous remedy of challenging
the validity of the classification as a defense to a criminal prosecution
for refusal to submit to induction.
The United States Supreme Court did not readily commit itself
concerning the availability of judicial review in this area. Two years
after the 1940 Act the Court held that certain Selective Service System
records were not available to a registrant in a criminal trial for failing
to report for induction, 28 thus evading the question of the availability
of invalid classification as a defense in such a trial. In a dictum, 29 how-

ever, the Court did state that habeas corpus after induction was the
30
proper method of review. Not until 1944, in Falbo v. United States,
did the Supreme Court directly hold that an erroneous classification was
not a defense; the sole question for the trial court was whether or not
the defendant submitted to induction as ordered.
The Falbo opinion, singularly, in accord with the vast majority of
lower court cases, 31 expressed a philosophy possibly owing its existence
to its frame of reference, a country experiencing the third of four
difficult war years. That was a time when one might be tempted to
believe that neither did the current moral pattern demand, nor did military expediency allow, leniency to those who sought to avoid military
service. It is reasonable to so speculate with regard to the underlying
elements fostering the Falbo decision, because shortly after the cessation
26.

See note 1 supra.

27. Methods of review unsuccessfully attempted were declaratory judgments, injunction, and writs of certiorari and mandamus. There is a compilation of these cases
in Connor and Clarke, supra note 1, at 349.
28. Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33 (1942).

29. Id. at 35.
30. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
31. Broneman v. United States, 138 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943); Fletcher v. United States, 129 F.2d 262 (5th
Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Grieme, 128 F.2d 811 (3rd Cir. 1942). These cases advance
various rationales for their decisions, e.g., the menace of war and nature of the draft
function, that there exists adequate possibility of review both within the System itself
and by habeas corpus after induction.

NOTES
of hostilities the Court executed what amounted to a judicial pirouette
by declaring, in Estep v. United States,32 that the invalidity of a classification may be introduced as a defense in a trial for failure to submit
to induction; it is for the trial court to decide if there was a basis in
fact for the board's classification. The Court attempted to distinguish
the Falbo case by viewing that decision as resting on the defendant's
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies because he could have
33
pursued the avenues of appeal within the Selective Service System.

Granting the technical validity of the Court's basis for distinguishing the Falbo and Estep cases, it cannot be denied that the philosophies
underlying the two decisions are basically incompatible. Illustrative of
the narrow approach implicit in the Falbo opinion is the rationale that
"surely if Congress had intended to authorize interference with that
process [Selective Service] by intermediate challenges of orders to
report, it would have said so.Q'34 In contrast with this naive approach,
the Court in the Estep case indicated its realization of the scope of the
problem by stating: "We are dealing here with a question of personal
liberty," 35 and later, the Court "cannot readily infer that Congress departed so far from the traditional concepts of fair trial when it made
the actions of the local boards 'final' as to provide that a citizen of this
country should go to jail for not obeying an unlawful order of an
36
administrative agency."
This demonstration of judicial ability to cope with a change in
situation was not quickly reflected by the lower courts. Divers theories
arose concerning the extent to which administrative remedies must be
exhausted prior to securing judicial review of a board ruling. A Tenth
Circuit case 37 held that a registrant must report for induction even
though he need not submit to the induction process; another court of
appeals 38 and a district court3 9 refused to review classifications because
the registrants, due to peculiar circumstances, could have demanded
physical examinations at the induction center, after which they might
have been declared unfit for service. The decisions which indicated an
attempt to distinguish Estep v. United States are largely confined to the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

327 U.S. 114 (1946).
Id. at 116, 123.
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944).
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946).
Ibid.
Hudson v. United States, 157 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1946).
United States v. Balogh, 160 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1947).
United States v. Kirschenman, 65 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.S.D. 1946).
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year following that case; however, today most courts accept the Estep
rule without offering either criticism or justification. 40
The Estep decision expressed a cogent philosophy-allowing judicial review before induction-but applied it in an unduly stringent
manner by requiring that a registrant submit to criminal prosecution to
obtain such review. Although most lower courts have recognized and
followed the ruling of the Estep decision, only recently has the basic
principle been fully effectuated. In Ex parte Fabiani,41 petitioner was
held to be in constructive custody; the court reasoned that actual physical
restraint at the time habeas corpus is requested is unnecessary because
the limitations placed upon one's liberty by the order to report for
42
induction are tantamount to physical custody. The court's justification for its invocation of constructive custody was that the registrant
43
would otherwise be subjected to unwarranted hardship. This theory,
44
when initially propounded in 1944 in Biron v. Collins, was rejected
on appeal because the concept deviated from traditional habeas corpus
45
doctrine.
Constructive custody is not so far removed from past practice in
the Selective Service area as superficial examination might indicate.
Both the Selective Service System 46 and the judiciary47 have permitted
convicted registrants to choose induction into the service as an alternative to imprisonment. This practice, in effect, converts the criminal
trial into a mere pre-induction review of the draft board's actions, a
result also reached in the Fabiani case with the important difference
that the petitioner avoids the humiliation of being indicted and tried
for a felony.
There is obviously an adequate body of prior decision upon which
to base a reversal of the Fabiani case. But the nature of the evolution
of judicial attitudes regarding review has been toward leniency to the
registrant. Furthermore, congressional approval of the tendency to
make review more readily available is evident from the legislative
40. United States v. Strebel, 103 F. Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1952) ; United States v.
Everngam, 102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. W.Va. 1951). So well has the Estep rule been accepted
that there have been no cases directly questioning the availability of the defense in a
criminal proceeding of invalid classification on the appellate level during the past three
years.
41. 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
42. Id. at 148; Biron v. Collins, 56 F. Supp. 357, 361 (S.D. Ala. 1944).
43. Supra note 41, at 144. Biron v. Collins, 56 F. Supp. 357, 360 (S.D. Ala. 1944).
44. 56 F. Supp. 357 (S.D. Ala. 1944).
45. Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1944).
46. 32 CODE FED. Rms. § 643.1-642.11 (Cum. Supp. 1946).
47. See Connor and Clarke, supra note 1, at 370.

NOTES
history of the 1948 Selective Service and Training Act.48 Although
previously accepted methods of review should be augmented by a more
sensible procedure, the question of the advisability of the Fabiani
approach requires resolution.
In the past both the legislature4 9 and the judiciary" have based
their review policy on the gravity of the need for immediate mobilization, a consideration that undoubtedly influenced the district court to
propose in 1952 a concept which had seemed inadvisable in the war
year 1944. The courts have recently reinforced this pragmatic attitude
with the underlying philosophy that Selective Service statutes and regulations should be interpreted in a manner involving the least hardship
for registrants allegedly classified incorrectly. 51 The Fabiani case is
singularly in harmony with this philosophy.
The courts, in considering controversies which arose under the
1940 Selective Service Act, referred to World War I cases for guidance.52 There they discovered the rule that the proper procedure for
48. The committee report on the Act makes this legislative acceptance somewhat
obvious: "No changes have been made in the nature of judicial review of the Selective
Service classifications. Instead, it is contemplated that the procedure and scope of
review defined by the Supreme Court in enforcing the 1940 Act will be equally applicable
under this legislation." The report then cites the Falbo and Estep cases. SEN. REP. No.
1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1948).
49. Judge McGranery, in the Fabiani opinion, calls attention to committee reports
to make this point clearer: "Later in his message he [the President] recommended the
temporary reenactment of Selective Service, pointing out that our armed forces lack
the necessary men to maintain their authorized strength and that their necessary
strength cannot be maintained by vohtary enlistments' (Italics ours)." SEN. REP. No.
1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), quoted in Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 146
(E.D. Pa. 1952). "'It [the 1951 Act] will enable the armed forces to immediately
raise and maintain an armed force of sufficient size, as determined by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to meet our inimnunm security requirements' . . . (emphasis ours)." H.R. REP.
No. 271, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), quoted in Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 146
(1944).
50. That this factor is a consideration is evident from even Falbo v. United States:
"When the Selective Training and Service Act was passed September, 1940, most of
the world was at war. The preamble of the Act declared it 'imperative to increase
and train the personnel of the armed forces of the United States.' The danger of
attack by our present enemies, if not imminent, was real, as subsequent events have
grimly demonstrated. The Congress was faced with the urgent necessity of integrating
all the nation's people and forces for national defense. That dire consequences might
flow from apathy and delay was well understood. Accordingly the Act was passed to
mobilize national manpower with the speed which that necessity and understanding
required." 320 U.S. 549, 555 (1944).
51. United States v. Strebel, 103 F. Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1952) ; United States v.
Romano, 103 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Ex parte Barrial, 101 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.
Cal. 1951); United States v. Everngam, 102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. W.Va. 1951); a particularly strong statement of this philosophy is found in Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring opinion, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129, 130 (1946).
52. United States ex rel. Zucker v. Osborne, 147 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United
States v. Grieme, 128 F.2d 811, 814 (3rd Cir. 1942) ; United States ex tel. Filomio v.
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review of a classification was to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
after induction into the service. In applying this rule, however, no
consideration was given to the fact that under the 1917 Act the registrant
53
became subject to military law when he received orders to report,
while the 1940 Act provided that civil law governed until the induction
ceremony. 4 As a consequence of this judicial oversight the World
War II registrant was unable to challenge the draft board ruling before
he was in physical custody of the service.
Although review after induction was not an inequitable remedy by
the standards of the 1917 statute, 55 its adequacy under the statutes of
1940, 1948, and 1951 is certainly questionable, as the Fabiani decision
recognizes. Delay in the availability of review until the registrant is
in physical custody of the armed services, or is indicted as a felon, has
a significant impact on the individual concerned. Review by habeas
corpus prior to induction would release erroneously classified registrant from many unwarranted hardships.
It is indeed an extreme attitude to expect a registrant to undergo
criminal prosecution in order to challenge his classification; and the
alternative that he must submit to induction before bringing habeas
corpus also involves difficulties of no mean consideration. 56 Once
inducted, a man will generally be sent to a training center distant from
his counsel and witnesses. A more potent consideration is the fact that
after induction the draftee will be removed for an unknown length of
time from his business or profession,5" and, if he is a farmer, an
absence from his crops for even a relatively short period may prove
disastrous. Even though a registrant petitions for habeas corpus after
induction it is not certain that the writ will be granted. He is therefore
faced with a dilemma, whether or not to wind up his personal and business affairs. Nor is the personal inconvenience suffered by one wrongfully inducted an insignificant factor; regardless of his occupation, he
Powell, 38 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1941). See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 124,
n.17.
53. The 1917 Act provided that, "[a]ll persons drafted into the service of the
United States . . . shall, from the date of said draft or acceptance, be subject to the
laws and regulations governing the Regular Army...." 40 STAT. 77 (1917). The
Articles of War then in force had substantially the same effect. 39 STAT. 619 (1916)
(Art. II(a)). Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918), and United States ex
rel. Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704 (2d Cir. 1923) sustained charges of desertion though
the petitioners had never been in custody of the armed services.

54. 54

STAT.

885 (1940).

55. See Connor and Clarke, supra note 1, at 351.
56. See Note, 32 VA. L. REv. 618, 642 (1946).
57. This is forcefully expressed in Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring opinion, Estep
v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 130 (1946).

NOTES
will be removed from his home and family for what the Fabiani case
points out is an unnecessary time.
Added to these adversities imposed upon the registrant is the fact
that review of a classification before induction places no greater burden
on the draft board, the government attorneys, or the court than one
after induction.
But despite its equitableness, its accordance with an existing philosophy of fairness, and its recognition of the military demands of the
time, the Fabianirule makes judicial review more readily available, and
arguments can be made questioning the desirability of such an alteration.
In reversing the Biron case in 1944 the appellate court declared
that "decisions must be followed,"58 and, therefore, the writ of habeas
corpus could not be utilized in the absence of actual physical restraint.
Admittedly, an impressive body of case law requires physical custody
before a writ will issue; therefore, acceptance of the constructive custody
principle would be an extension of the historical office of habeas corpus.
But, no a priori reason requires that this extension should not be undertaken. Indeed, the function of the writ has been constantly expanded
since the time of the Tudors, and its added flexibility has resulted in
increased usefulness in obvious ways.
During the Tudor reign habeas corpus was used solely by the
Common Law courts to challenge the jurisdiction of rival tribunals such
as Chancery, Court of Requests, Admiralty, and the High Commission."0
Then the writ became the proper method of testing the validity of
imprisonment without cause by the executive.60 Later its use was authorized to challenge restraint by private individuals. 6 1 And though
habeas corpus was suspended in 1863 during the Civil War by Presidential proclamation 6 2 it was utilized in 1944 during World War II to
test the legality of detaining people of Japanese ancestry in Relocation
Centers0 3 and resulted in the release of all American citizens from such
detention.6 4 The growth of habeas corpus is a manifestation of the
concept that law should be more concerned with ends than with origins.
In light of past employments of the writ of habeas corpus it is evident
58. Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1944).
59.
60.

Wyzanski, The Writ of Habeas Corpts, 243 ANNALS 101 (1946).
Ibid. This usage was originally denied in the courts, Darnel's case, 3 S.T. 1

(1627) but was declared valid in the Petition of Right in 1628.
61. 56 Geo. III, c. 100 (1816).
62. 1 MoRIsoN AN COMIAGER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 699.
63. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).

64. Wyzanski, supra note 59, at 106.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that the constructive custody concept would not involve an extension
inconsonant with the history of the writ.
Simply stated, another of the arguments against the Fabiani rule
is the flood of litigation theory, which asserts that the proposed method
of review would result in such an influx of litigants to the courts that
the change would prove inadvisable. Admittedly, a registrant should,
and presumably must, utilize as far as he can the appeal procedure
available within the System itself. It is not certain that acceptance of
the Fabiani proposal would bring this increase in litigants. But even
assuming so, arguendo, the advent of such a flood does not of itself,
validate the argument.
There is no basis in fact to believe that the nature of the additional
claims will be dilatory, i.e., actions brought by validly classified registrants seeking merely to delay induction into the armed services. This
conclusion is reached inductively by the fact that there has been in the
past a paucity of such claims coupled with increased acceptance by young
men of the idea that some military service is inevitable. Also worthy
of consideration is the fact that a frivolous challenge of a draft classification would result in a social stigma; this psychological factor seems
adequate to prevent a significant number of dilatory claims.
There is, furthermore, a strong possibility that the extension will
permit a review for numerous invalidly classified registrants who would
neither subject themselves to prosecution as a felon nor find it practicable to petition for habeas corpus once in the service. If this proves
to be the case, the constructive custody doctrine would be justified
despite an increase in litigation. It is unwise to invoke an argument
based upon the hardships on the courts arising from such an increase
if the challenged classifications are in fact invalid. If experience demonstrates that the increased number of claims adds to the already heavy
case load on the courts, there are at least two feasible remedies.
The first alternative is to revise the Selective Service System to
expand the present appeals procedure so that much of the potential
litigation may be satisfactorily resolved within the administrative framework. Such reorganization would require very careful consideration
in order to avoid the possibility of destroying the present System's public
acceptance, one of the primary reasons for which has been the method
of classification by neighbors of the registrants. A second possibility
would be to establish special "ad hoc" courts for the purpose of litigating these issues. There is precedent for such tribunals; the Customs
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Court and the Court of 'Claims were created on the theory that the
organization of the judiciary should be adjusted to cope with the amount
of litigation, rather than to permit an inflexible judicial organization to
stifle the volume of litigation.615
Though the desirability of the Fabiani principle is not lessened by
the possibility of increased litigation, superficial merit exists in the
contention that constructive custody would permit "litigous interruption" of the Selective Service process. 66 But the argument is rendered
largely insignificant by the impotence of the flood of litigation assertion.
Yet, opponents of the constructive concept might counter that any
litigious interruption is inadvisable. To properly evaluate this contention the existing manpower situation must be studied. When the courts
refused to adopt the constructive custody proposal in 1944 the United
States was experiencing a manpower shortage coupled with a need for
immediate mobilization. Since that time, however, external conditions
have changed.
At present, the country does not face what might properly be called
a manpower shortage, as is emphasized by the increased leniency in
granting draft deferments in the past few years. 67 Furthermore, with
the present reservoir of trained reserves, there is little likelihood of any
sudden necessity for unavailable manpower; 6 8 this situation is indicative
of the gradual change in the character of compulsory service in this
country, i.e., the shift from emergency conscription to the Continental
standing army system.
In addition, the litigious interruption argument deteriorates further
since it can also be proposed against the long accepted policy of the
Estep case.
Another contention might be that since it is within the power of
Congress to do away with all exemptions inasmuch as they are mere
concessions of a benevolent legislature, there is little need to make
judicial review as readily available as does the Fabianirule. But having
recognized the need for judicial review in this area, surely the legislature
should not be subjected to the gratuitous imputation that they intended
to deny its effective implementation. In light of the foregoing discus65. See HuRsT,TuE GROWTH OF AmmIcAN LAW 433 (1950).
66. This argument was also asserted against review of classification in a criminal
proceeding, Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944).
67. An ,example of this is the policy of the System to allow college st'udents-deferments. 38 CODE FED. RE:Gs. § 1622.15 (Cum.Supp. 1951).
68. Judge McGranery cited General George C. Marshall concerning this point in

Ex parteFabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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sion the Fabiani rule appears the most efficacious method thus far propounded.
So, the last of the propositions that may be asserted against constructive custody appears as inapplicable as those preceding it. Moreover, positive justification exists for the suggested extension, since
earlier availability of judicial review will more fully protect the registrant's individual liberty without obstructing realization of the country's
mobilization goals.

FEDERAL VENUE AND THE CORPORATE PLAINTIFF:
JUDICIAL CODE SECTION 1391 (c)
In 1948 Congress revised the Judicial Code with the passage of
the Judicial and Judiciary Act; Section 1391(c) treats the difficult
problem of corporate venue in the federal courts.' A court must, before
it can adjudicate, gain jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties involved. With jurisdiction obtained, the question of proper
venue must be settled. While Section 1391 (c) explicitly allows a corporation, in diversity of citizenship cases, to be sued in a federal district
where it is incorporated, licensed to do, or is doing, business, it raises
a question with regard to its meaning for the corporate plaintiff.
The persistent problem of reconciling the migratory nature of
corporations with an inclination to confine their efficacy has plagued the
courts since the nation's founding. An indelible and virtually unchallenged theory of non-migration prevailed until EX Parte Schollenberger2
"displaced metaphor with common sense." 3 In the light of acquiescence
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
"(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
"(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as
otherwise provided by law.
"(c) A corporationmay be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1952). (emphasis added)
2. 96 U.S. 369 (1877). This case was based on two earlier opinions. Chicago and

Northwestern Ry. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (U.S. 1871); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U.S. 1870).
3.

Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939).

